INTRODUCTION
Single-room occupancy (SRO) housing once dominated the New York City housing market. As recently as the mid-twentieth century, there were hundreds of thousands of SROs spread throughout the City. Today, following a half-century of concerted attacks by City government, SROs constitute a fraction of a single percent of New York's rental housing stock.
The City's decimation of SRO housing has amplified the ongoing housing crisis, constricting the low-income housing market and contributing to the ballooning homelessness problem. The overall effect on poor and working-class residents has been tragic.
The current dearth of SRO units is not the inevitable result of impersonal or unalterable market forces. City policy, acting dynamically with market forces, is responsible for the crisis, and a change in policy can undo the damage. If City and State are serious about confronting New York City's housing crisis, existing SRO policies need to be changed and their legacy confronted. City and State must take steps to permit and encourage the expansion of the SRO housing stock. This effort will require stemming the conversion of existing SROs to other (higher profit) uses and creating legal avenues for the construction or reconversion of additional units.
This Article will analyze the role of SROs in the City's housing market. We will discuss the importance of SRO housing and the history of SRO policy. We will briefly describe the nature of the City's housing crisis and the role SROs play in that crisis. Finally, we will make several suggestions as to how SRO policies should be changed to alleviate the impact of the housing crisis on low-income City residents. 
criteria.
8 SRO units located within hotels 9 are regulated if the rent was less than $350 per month, or $88 per week, on May 31, 1968; if the hotel was built before July 1, 1969; and if the hotel contains six or more units. 10 All other SRO units are subject to regulation if located in a building containing six or more units that was constructed prior to January 1, 1974. 11 The New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR) together with New York State Courts, have the authority to determine, upon application, whether an SRO unit is subject to rent stabilization. 12 In recognition of the unique nature of SRO housing, the rules governing SRO tenancies are "very different" from those governing 8 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 26-506(a) (McKinney 2013) ; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.11. The rent regulatory status of SROs was, for some time, contested. The issue was not settled with any degree of certainty until the late 1990s. City and State enacted various rent regulation laws between 1946 and 1974 . In 1981 , the Court of Appeals held that (most) SROs were not covered by these laws and thus they were not regulated. La Guardia v. Cavanaugh, 53 N.Y.2d 67, 76-80 (1981) (applying holding to Class B multiple dwellings). The New York State legislature almost immediately passed a law intended to reverse the decision. See Tegreh Realty Corp. v. Joyce, 451 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (1st Dep't 1982) . Then, in 1997, the Court of Appeals ruled that even the most basic SROs were regulated. See Gracecor Realty Co. v. Hargrove, 90 N.Y.2d 350, 354 (1997) (holding that a "partitioned space" in a lodging house was subject to rent stabilization). 9 Hotel is not defined in the Rent Stabilization Law (RSL) except in the following passing statement:
[A]ny Class A multiple dwelling . . . commonly regarded as a hotel, transient hotel or residential hotel, and which customarily provides hotel service such as maid service, furnishings and laundering of linen, telephone and bell boy service, secretarial or desk service and use and upkeep of furniture and fixtures 14 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2520.6(j), (m); see also id. § 2522.5(a)(2) (stipulating that a hotel occupant renting a room who has never had a lease may request a lease and then become a permanent tenant for a term of at least six months, but the lease need not be renewed).
15 Id. § 2520.6(m). 16 See Kruttack, slip. op. at 6; but see 1234 Broadway LLC v. Pou Long Chen, 938 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Table) , 2011 WL 4026908 (App. Term 1st Dep't Sept. 9, 2011) (holding that someone who came into possession of an SRO unit through an illicit arrangement with a long-absent prime tenant and who had in no way communicated with, made herself known to, or received permission from the landlord was not entitled to possession of the SRO unit).
17 Suzanne Daley, Court Ruling Brings Fear to S.R.O. Hotel Rooms, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 1989) , http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/10/nyregion/court-ruling-brings-fear-tosro-hotel-rooms.html. 18 See Memorandum from N.Y.C. Rent Guidelines Board for All Board Members 4 (June 12, 2012) (on file with co-authors). These figures are based on testimony offered to the Rent Guidelines Board by Goddard-Riverside's West-Side SRO Law Project in 2008 and data they derived from the 2002 Housing and Vacancy Survey. We cite a range rather than a single figure here for two reasons. First, there is a high degree of variance in SRO units and an accordingly high variance in rent charged. Second, unlike other units, SROs are rarely singled out or disaggregated from census rent data, and therefore precise information on rental rates is more difficult to find. [Vol. 17:113 rent for a rent-controlled unit is $895 per month; for a rentstabilized unit is $1,160; and for an unregulated unit is $1,510.
19
SROs are frequently the only form of housing affordable to poor households. Rent is affordable for a poor New York City household at the (maximum) rate of $600.60 per month. 20 The median rent-controlled unit (the next cheapest form of housing after SROs) is therefore almost $300 per month too expensive for a poor household. 21 For New Yorkers who live on Social Security or public assistance, there are few affordable rental units in the City. As of January 2014, the SSI benefit rate for a one-person household is $808 per month.
22
New York City's Human Resources Administration (HRA or Public Assistance) pays a shelter allowance of $215 per month for a single individual.
23
There is an uncontested relationship between the availability of SRO housing and homelessness. 24 The loss of SRO units over recent decades has opened a gaping hole at the affordable end of the housing market, with predictable effects: the loss of low-rent SRO units simultaneously pushed poorer households into the streets and (temporarily) into higher-rent units, which put pressure on the middle of the market. Now, the City is suffering
In the past, the Rent Guidelines Board has refused to base estimates of SRO rents on registered rents on the ground they are unreliable. N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BD., EXPLANATORY STATEMENT-HOTEL ORDER #37, at 8 n.4 (June 27, 2007) Inchoate hostility toward "congregate living" has been a feature of City politics since at least the mid-nineteenth century. 33 However, City housing policy only turned comprehensively against SROs in the mid-1950s. Beginning around 1955, and continuing for nearly three decades thereafter, the City attempted to eliminate SRO housing.
34
The City's anti-SRO policy was born out of the explosive growth of low-rent SRO units during the Great Depression and the WWII era. In the 1920s, landlords began (largely illegally) dividing larger units into small SROs to rent to the unemployed and newly poor. Through the 1930s and 1940s, landlords continued to convert units to accommodate workers seeking jobs in the City's wartime munitions factories, and then returning soldiers, migrants from the South, and immigrants (largely from Puerto Rico).
35
The appearance of the new SROs had two important effects. First, the new units greatly increased the visibility of SRO housing. By mid-century, the total number of SRO rooms had risen above 200,000-more than 10% of the City's rental stock. 36 "SRO housing," "bad housing," and the poor.
37
SRO growth thus worked to focus the hostility of "good government types" discomfited by the living conditions of the poor-and the poor themselves.
38 New York's anti-SRO activists and officials were the heirs of its Progressive Era reformers.
39 While animated by a desire to do good, their actions reflected the Progressive conception of the "housing problem," 40 informed by class biases, social prejudices, and varying degrees of xenophobia and racism. 41 The tipping point for these reformers was crossed when poor families-particularly, and not inconsequentially, immigrant families-began moving into the new SROs in large numbers.
42 By the early 1950s, families with children had replaced 37 See Gladwell, supra note 1 (reporting that in the post-WWII era SROs were known as "short term housing for the working poor" and "soon acquired an unsavory reputation"). 38 This characterization is Blackburn's. See generally BLACKBURN, supra note 1. 39 GROTH, supra note 31, at 203-33, 238-46 (describing nineteenth and twentieth century origins and details of housing reform movement, and noting central role of reformers and activists based in New York).
40 Id. at 241. 41 Id. Groth recounts the influence of the Progressive Era view that "the solution of the housing problem . . . is to be found chiefly in legislation preventing the erection of objectionable buildings and securing the adequate maintenance of all buildings." He also traces the heritage of the anti-SRO movement:
[Early SRO critics] were generally self-appointed and wealthy businessmen-or their wives or minions-who volunteered their time and considerable talents for public good. . . . Given their personal class origins, most progressive reformers did not see low wages, uneven work availability, or industrial leadership as being primarily culpable for the urban chaos. . . . Like other Progressive Era figures, urban activists initially attacked the problems of downtown [or SRO] living as moral and cultural failures. They saw new ethnic, religious, and political subcultures as threatening to hard-won changes in polite family life. . . . The reformers were convinced that stronger, centrally ordained, and better-enforced building rules would bring uplift to the lower class and civic betterment to the city as a whole. . . . Better housing meant not only better environmental health but also better social control. Promotion of material progress became a prime tool of social engineering. . . . Even when they were not acting en masse in some political agitation, hotel people seemed to be forming subcultures that deepened the social schisms of the time and weakened the cultural hegemony of the middle and upper class. Reformers saw these dangers as an assault on the urban polity as a whole . . . . Stated most simply, to its critics the continued existence of hotel life worked against the progress of the grand new city. In the biological analogies of the day, the residential hotel buildings themselves served as incubators of oldcity pathologies. For the reformers working on the new city, single-room dwellings were not a housing resource but a public nuisance. Id. at 202-31. 42 Gladwell, supra note 1 ("In a few celebrated cases, chaotic conditions resulted [Vol. 17:113 single adults as the predominant occupants of the new SROs.
43
The City quickly moved to put SROs "out of business."
44
Beginning in 1955, and continuing through the 1970s, the City enacted a series of measures that drastically shrank the SRO housing stock and irreversibly altered patterns of SRO occupancy. The City banned the construction of new SRO units, 45 restricted SRO occupancy to exclude families, 46 mandated the reconversion of many of the new SRO units, 47 altered building and zoning codes to discourage SRO occupancy, 48 and, from the mid-1970s until the 1980s, provided tax incentives to encourage the conversion of all SRO units to (higher rent) apartments.
49
The 1970s were particularly disastrous for SROs. By the end of the decade, the City was granting tax breaks to landlords to convert more than 40 SRO buildings a year.
50 According to one study by the State Assembly, between 1976 and 1981 the City's tax program caused the elimination of nearly two-thirds of all remaining SRO units.
51
The City's tax program amplified the impact of market forces pushing landlords away from SRO housing. Throughout the 1960s, landlords were tempted to convert SROs into high rent apartments as demand for luxury housing increased in previously marginal neighborhoods. The interplay between market forces and government policy was dynamic: landlords, responding to market and government signals, quickly emptied and converted the most desirable buildings. The remaining SROs (increasingly occupied by regulated tenants) came to be seen as a poor investment and were left to rot. 52 As the condition of these SROs deteriorated, tenants who could afford to leave moved out. The buildings were increasingly occupied by "the poorest people."
53 The City's tax policies gave owners an extra push to remove these tenants and when owners on the Upper West Side of Manhattan rented SROs to families with children, largely Latino immigrants.").
43 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 7. 44 See Gladwell, supra note 1. 45 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § § 27-2077 CODE § § 27- , 27-2078 CODE § § 27- (2013 Between 1955 and 1985, wages had stagnated, poverty and unemployment had increased, and the State had "dumped" more than 125,000 low-income patients from mental-health hospitals into the City.
61 Consequently, the homeless population spiked to by far the worst levels in the country. Study after study found that large numbers of the homeless, including "about half" of homeless men entering shelters in 1980, had lived in SROs before being pushed out onto the street.
62
Responding to the crisis, the City attempted to reverse course. Over the course of several years, it cancelled the mandate to convert new SRO units, stopped providing tax credits to convert SRO buildings, passed a new tenant anti-harassment law, and funded legal services offices dedicated to providing representation to SRO tenants. 63 Then, in 1985, the City Council passed an ambitious law that temporarily banned the "conversion, alteration, or demolition" of SRO buildings. 64 The ban was subsequently made permanent and an anti-warehousing provision, which required landlords to rent vacant units, was added. 65 Unfortunately, the City's actions were too little, too late. The SRO housing stock was already critically depleted. Market forces were pushing landlords harder than ever toward apartment conversions. The anti-harassment law was ineffective as landlords violated, and the City failed to effectively enforce, its provisions. 66 Finally, in 1989 the conversion ban and anti-warehousing provisions were struck down by the New York Court of Appeals.
67
Since the Court of Appeals decision, the City's SRO policy has Look, SROs Make a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 1996) , http://www.nytimes.com/ 1996/11/10/nyregion/with-new-purpose-and-look-sro-s-make-a-comeback.html (discussing "wholesale conversion" of SROs into luxury apartments); BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 8 ("A 1980 audit of the J-51 program indicated that 41 SRO conversions received J-51 abatements in FY 1979 alone.").
60 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 8. See also Gladwell, supra note 1; Daley, supra note 17; MARKEE, supra note 25. 61 Malone, supra note 51, at 761-67 (discussing increasing unemployment and an effort to empty mental-health hospitals).
62 Gladwell, supra note 1 (discussing a 1980 survey of men entering homeless shelters); Daley, supra note 17 (reporting that "many studies have shown that large numbers of the city's homeless once lived in rooming houses").
63 BLACKBURN, supra note 1, at 7-9. been in disarray. On the one hand, there is now broad recognition that SROs are vitally important. The City regrets the loss of SROs and tends to encourage the development of new units-largely in non-profit, "supportive" SROs-to the limited extent permitted by law. 68 At the same time, there is a real sense that, with the numbers having fallen so far, the whole situation is a lost cause. SROs also continue to have a negative reputation: former Mayor Michael Bloomberg's recent proposals to build SRO-type housing-tworoom, 275-square-foot units designed for occupancy by single individuals at affordable rents-have studiously avoided the use of the word "SRO."
69
The result, as illustrated by the following three examples, is a toxic mix of paralysis and dysfunction.
A. Rent Regulation
The full and effective incorporation of SROs into the rent regulation system remains an unfinished project. In rent overcharge cases, however, DHCR has frequently permitted vacancy increases without comment. More commonly, it has attempted to limit the increases using a mechanical application of the statute that makes little sense. An owner's right to take a vacancy increase is triggered only when a tenant signs a vacancy lease. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2522.8(a) (2013) ("The legal regulated rent for any vacancy lease [shall be] . . . ."). The amount of the increase is set by a formula that turns upon (a) the length of the lease (one or two years); and (b) certain provisions of the RGB's Apartment Orders. The formula can be straightforwardly applied to all apartment tenancies. It cannot be applied to the vast majority of SRO tenancies. All apartment owners are required to offer incoming tenants vacancy leases (one or two years); apartment tenants are required to sign the leases; and both are subject to the RGB's Apartment Orders. In contrast, SRO owners are not required to offer incoming tenants leases and the term that must be offered in response to a lease request is six months. SRO tenants are never required to sign a lease. Finally, it is far from clear that the terms of RGB Apartment Orders can be applied to SRO tenancies. For these reasons, the courts have become increasingly critical of DHCR and any attempt to apply vacancy increases to SRO tenants. See, e.g., Hous. Dev. Ass'n, LLC v. Gilpatrick, 910 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Table) , 2010 WL 1691595, at *1 (App. Term 1st Dep't Apr. 28, 2010) (affirming lower court decision holding vacancy increases do not apply to SROs). In Gilpatrick, the court noted:
Even were we to assume, in the petitioner owner's favor, that . . . vacancy increases . . . are available to owners of stabilized hotel units as well as stabilized apartment units, the vacancy increase formulas set forth in the cited provisions and DHCR's own interpretation of . . . section 2522.8(a) confirm that no vacancy increase may be recovered unless a hotel owner offers an incoming tenant the option of a vacancy lease for a one-or two-year term. Id. Second, owners take advantage of the special nature of SRO tenancies to surreptitiously deregulate units. The RSC states that the legal rent for a unit becomes the rent "agreed to by the owner and the . . . tenant" if the unit was "vacant or temporarily exempt" on the "base date." N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2526.1(a)(3)(iii). The "base date" is the date exactly four years prior to the date a tenant challenges a particular unit's rental amount. Id. § 2520.6(f). The RSC also provides that units are deregulated once the rent goes above $2,500. Id. § 2520.11(r). Owners claim that these provisions permit the deregulation of any unit that has been registered as vacant or exempt for four years: section 2526.1(a)(3)(iii) in combination with section 2520.6(f) permit the owner to unilaterally increase the legal (vacancy) rent for the unit above $2,500; and section 2520.11(r) then mandates deregulation. Apartment owners are rarely able to take advantage of this combination of provisions, as the circumstances under which an apartment is "temporarily exempt" are limited. See, e.g., id. § 2520.11(f), (j), (m). Generally, the provisions come into play only where an apartment has been held vacant for years or has been rented to a superintendent. See, e.g the "legal regulated rent was the rent listed in the initial lease" where apartment was vacant on base date). The situation is very different, and much more easily manipulated, in SROs. SRO units are "temporarily exempt" whenever they are not occupied by a permanent tenant-meaning whenever they are occupied by a person who has not requested a lease or lived in the unit for six months. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § § 2520.11(g)(1), 2520.6(j), 2520.6(m); cf. id. § 2522.5(a)(2). It is, therefore, relatively easy for an SRO owner to create the impression that the rent-setting provisions of the regulatory code have responsibility for enforcing the rent laws, are in a weak position to oppose even the most blatant violations. 71 Large numbers of SRO tenants have no idea that SROs are regulated.
72 SRO landlords uniformly ignore their obligation to provide occupants with a "Notice of Rights." 73 Many refuse, without effective penalty, to even register their buildings with DHCR, leaving tenants in a difficult limbo.
74
As a result, even the most basic rent regulation protections frequently are not enforced. 74 Tenants in unregistered buildings/rooms do not receive registration statements. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2528.3. The statements are frequently the prompt that causes tenants to contact legal services organizations about their rent or to pursue rent overcharges on their own. Unregistered tenants that inquire about their rent with DHCR are informed that the agency has "no record" of the unitwhich is commonly (though incorrectly) interpreted to mean that the unit is not regulated. Tenants that continue to pursue the matter cannot file an RA-89 rent overcharge complaint. They must file a Request for an Administrative Determination. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2521. This is a more complicated proceedingand one which occasionally results in DHCR setting the "regulated" rent at whatever the landlord happens to be charging the tenant at the time. 75 For example, DHCR data indicates that owners are increasing registered rents at a rate that greatly exceeds that permitted under the Rent Guidelines Board Hotel [Vol. 17:113
B. Certificate of No Harassment (CONH)
The CONH program 76 was enacted after the City's reversecourse on SRO housing in the early 1980's. 77 Under the program, an owner cannot make certain changes to an SRO 78 (i.e., demolish or convert SRO units or change the number of bathrooms or kitchens) without acquiring certification that there has been "[no] harassment of the lawful occupants of the property during [the preceding three years]."
79 Thus acquisition of a CONH is a necessary step in any legal conversion of an SRO to a higher-rent use. The program is primarily administered by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (DHPD), which investigates owners' applications.
80
The CONH program, in theory, presents a partial solution to the City's inability to simply bar all SRO conversions. It is meant to balance the public need for affordable housing with landlords' interests and constitutional rights. In practice, and putting to one side DHPD's inability, or occasional unwillingness, to prevent owners from simply ignoring the CONH requirement, 81 the program has been a disappointment. The most recent available data indicates DHPD grants upwards of 99% of all applications. 80 Id. 81 In the authors' professional experience, some owners have gone beyond simple non-compliance and have begun attempting to use the CONH program as a means to harass tenants. An owner will demolish part of the building (frequently the bathrooms) and then refuse to rebuild, (falsely) citing an inability to get permits because of the CONH requirement. Owners' attorneys occasionally use a variation on this argument in lawsuits brought by tenants to force compliance with housing standards laws.
82 Documents provided to MFY Legal Services, Inc. by DHPD show that the agency denied 23 of the 1480 applications it processed between 1998 and 2008.
The flaws in the CONH program are immense. DHPD is obligated to prove harassment occurred in order to block an owner's application. The Agency's ability to do this depends primarily upon current tenants coming forward to provide information to its staff. 83 Harassment, by definition, involves conduct designed to force tenants to forfeit their rights-and generally (at least in the conversion context) to move out. A contradiction is, therefore, built into the very base of the program. If a landlord is successful in harassing its tenants, those tenants will probably no longer live at the building and will be difficult for DHPD to reach; the Agency will not be able to secure the information or testimony of tenants who a landlord has successfully harassed into leaving. Therefore, successful landlord harassment will be the most difficult to identify and punish. In many cases, DHPD can prove harassment occurred only where it was unsuccessful. Other factors add to the problem. Owners routinely pull units off the market, holding them vacant for long periods of time, until the entire building is "naturally" emptied. The process can be sped up-and problematic information suppressed-by paying off tenants. With an empty building (or cooperating tenants), DHPD has no way to contradict an owner's assertion of no harassment. 84 The value of a CONHwhich can be the difference between owning a low-rent, regulated SRO and a boutique hotel 85 -more than offsets the cost of the lost rent and bribes.
C. Homelessness Policy
The City's response to the homelessness crisis threatens the remaining stock of regulated SRO housing. The Department of Homeless Services (DHS) and other City agencies are increasingly contracting with SRO owners to temporarily house homeless peo-83 Documents provided to MFY Legal Services by DHPD indicate that the vast majority of information contained in investigation files comes from current tenants. It appears that investigators do make an effort to reach out to prior tenants, but receive few substantive responses. 84 These statements are based upon the authors' discussions with DHPD officials and their experience investigating CONH applications. ple.
86 Individuals placed through these programs have no permanent rights to their rooms-they cannot become stabilized tenants. 87 The City thus helps create the problem it claims it is trying to solve: it removes affordable, regulated units from the market-increasing homelessness-and converts them into unregulated, temporary homeless "warehouses."
88
The incentives the City provides to induce participation in what has become a private shelter system are both staggering and puzzling. The City guarantees SRO owners a profit and pays rents that exponentially exceed the stabilized rates for rooms-as much as $3,000 per month as far back as the 1980s.
89 This willingness to spend contrasts sharply with City policy toward more cost-effective nonprofit shelters and rent subsidy programs. City funding for nonprofits is relatively modest and "constantly at risk." 90 In 2011, the City, pleading poverty, terminated rent subsidies for previously homeless families that had found permanent housing. 91 The City 87 Subsections (b) and (f) Div. 1st Dep't 2013) . At the time of publishing, the Appellate Division's decision in this matter is on appeal before the New York Court of Appeals. While this is a positive decision and hopefully marks a turn in New York courts' willingness to waive the clear protections of the RSC, the City and the State will likely continue to whittle away the SRO housing stock with programs that can apply subsections (b) and (f). 88 The characterization is from Coalition for the Homeless. See DAVIS, supra note 86. 89 See, e.g., Anna Quindlen, 'Give Us a Shot at Something,' N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/31/books/give-us-a-shot-at-something.html ("The city of New York spends as much as $3,000 a month for a family to live in a welfare hotel . . . ."); Joseph Berger, For Some Landlords, Real Money in the Homeless, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013) , http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/nyregion/for-some-landlordsreal-money-in-the-homeless.html ("The city's Department of Homeless Services pays many times the amount the rooms would usually rent for -spending $3,000 a month for each threadbare room without a bathroom or kitchen . . . ."). still has the money, however, to pay a premium to displace "longterm [SRO] residents."
92 As a policy analyst for Coalition for the Homeless observed:
The crisis that's causing the city to open so many new [SRO] shelters is mostly of the mayor's own making. . . . Instead of moving families out of shelters and into permanent housing, as previous mayors did, the city is now paying millions to landlords with a checkered past of harassing low-income tenants and failing to address hazardous conditions.
93
This problem shows no signs of abating. In conversation with the authors, SRO operators and their attorneys have suggested that capitalizing on City homelessness prevention subsidies is the most profitable operating strategy for many SROs, and thus the strategy that they plan to pursue. One SRO operator's attorney lamented the protections offered by rent stabilization because they made it more difficult to take advantage of these subsidies. History has shown that when City policy incentivizes the conversion of SRO units, owners will jump at the opportunity; current homeless policy is thus repeating past mistakes.
The problem does not stop there. Over the last several years, DHS and other City agencies have cooperated with an even more predatory scheme. In increasing numbers, SRO buildings have been (unlawfully) taken over by so-called Three-Quarter Houses.
94
These operations falsely hold themselves out as supportive housing to draw tenants from prisons, homeless shelters, and so forth.
95
Three-Quarter Houses uniformly deny residents rent stabilization, and even basic tenancy rights. Three-Quarter House tenants report that harassment and other abuses are common. 96 Nonetheless, until recently, the City looked to Three-Quarter Houses as a means to reduce the shelter population.
To make matters worse, anecdotal evidence suggests that 92 Berger, supra note 89. Medicaid fraud may be rampant in Three-Quarter House operations. Many operators require Three-Quarter House residents to participate in substance abuse or other so-called rehabilitative programs in order to maintain residency in a facility. The choice of which program to attend is not left to the resident. Rather, the operator forces the resident to attend a program that it either runs or with which it has a relationship. Each time that the resident visits the program, Medicaid makes a payment on her behalf. If a resident refuses to attend the program, she risks being evicted. The City's devastating SRO policies must be viewed in the context of-and as a cause of-its ongoing housing crisis. More than sixty years after the federal government first intervened in the City's housing market and froze rents, a "serious public emergency continues to exist in the housing of a considerable number of persons within the city of New York . . . ."
IV. NEW YORK CITY'S PERMANENT HOUSING CRISIS

98
New York City's low vacancy rate provides some measure of the severity of the housing crisis. Vacancy rates are frequently used as a general measure of the health and viability of a city's rental market.
99 As approximately 68% of New York City residents live in rental housing-more than double the national average-the importance of the City's rental market to overall housing conditions cannot be overstated.
100 Nationally, the average vacancy rate has ranged between approximately 9% and 11% in recent years. 101 The average vacancy rate for large cities is frequently SROs remain an integral part of the low-income market. Although rent-regulated SROs are a tiny fraction of the City's total rental stock, they still make up a significant percentage (5 to 15%) of all units affordable to poor New Yorkers.
131 Thus, the ongoingthough slowed-loss of units continues to have a devastating impact upon the availability of truly "affordable" housing.
And then there are the illegal units: the City's destruction of legal, regulated SROs caused an explosion in the number of illegal SROs. Illegally subdivided apartments and other SRO-type units currently house as many as 500,000 poor New Yorkers. 132 The City ignores their existence, including the danger they present, because it desperately needs these units. City officials rightly contend that illegal SROs present a "serious danger" to tenants and neighborhoods, 133 yet the City depends on illegal SROs to ward off a homeless crisis that would "dwarf" anything seen before. 134 stock, and the recommendations that follow are meant as the first step down that path.
While the return of SRO housing may provoke opposition, the facts are clear: New York City needs SROs-and SROs are not going away. SROs are as old as the modern City, and demand for basic, no-frills housing is a constant. The City's half-century-long attempt to eliminate SROs has contributed to unprecedented homelessness, and led to the explosive return of illegal and unsafe units. Opposition to SRO living must be reconsidered in light of the unique benefits SRO hotels provide.
A. Lift the Ban on the Construction of New SRO Units
The first step in restoring SRO housing is to lift the ban on the construction of new SRO units. In addition to allowing new units to be built, this change would permit the legalization of the existing yet illegal SRO stock.
139
Even without the construction of a single new unit, the City would benefit from the legalization of existing SRO-type housing. New York City relies on illegally converted SROs in order to house its citizens. Refusing to acknowledge the necessity of these units only strips residents of rights and exacerbates public safety problems. Legalization would simultaneously help remove a public safety threat and boost the stock of affordable, regulated housing. 140 Currently, residents of illegal SROs have few rights and po- 139 The construction ban denies tenants living in illegal SROs remedies available to tenants living in all other types of illegal units. Non-SRO tenants are entitled to come forward and claim stabilization rights. It would then be the landlord's burden to prove that the unit cannot be legalized if she wishes to evict . See Commercial Hotel, Inc. v. White, 752 (Table) , 2008 WL 4681929 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Oct. 23, 2008 . However, the right is far from clearly defined and an amendment of the legal framework would significantly advance the goal of rebuilding the SRO housing stock. Especially in the outer boroughs, a building's particular zoning classification can also be a legal hurdle. with by shifting the burden of proof. A presumption of harassment could be imposed on any CONH application where more than 30% of the building is empty, or where more than half of existing tenants moved out during the preceding three years.
144
The program could be further strengthened by tightening the definition of harassment. DHPD has complained that it is forced to prove that an owner "intended" to harass tenants by not keeping the building up to code. In light of the history neglect has played in SRO landlord-tenant relations, the law should be amended to make neglect, whatever the owner's intent, a form of harassment. Moreover, a presumption of harassment should apply in any case where: (1) a "C" violation (the most serious) has not been timely cured; or (2) a tenant has moved out of the building while there were more than five unresolved building violations per resident. In addition, failure to provide occupants with the Notice of Rightsan attempt to deny those rights if there ever was one-should be explicitly codified as a form of harassment.
Finally, to supplement DHPD's investigative capacity, and to give tenants a more active voice in the program, current and former tenants 145 should be made parties to CONH applications. Tenants should be allowed to appear at hearings with counsel as named parties rather than solely as witnesses DHPD may call at its own discretion. They should be allowed to submit evidence, examine witnesses, and appeal adverse decisions. Owners should be compelled to pay tenants' legal fees in any case where an application is denied.
The rent regulation laws also need to be reformed. The RSL and RSC need to be clarified to adequately account for differences between SROs and apartments. Loopholes that allow landlords to improperly increase SRO rents, or deregulate units, need to be closed. To start, the vacancy increase and "transient deregulation" schemes discussed in Part III above (particularly footnote 70), need to be prohibited. Vacancy increases allow SRO owners to take a permanent increase to the regulated rent when a unit becomes vacant. In light of SROs' unique position in the low-income market, and a long history of owner abuse, this increase needs to be explicitly prohibited. In the case of transient deregulation, owners claim the RSC allows them to unilaterally raise the "regulated" rent after a room has been registered (accurately or not) as "temporarily exempt due to transient occupancy" for a period of four years. If the owner chooses to set the rent above the high-rent destabilization threshold (currently $2,500 per month), the unit is effectively deregulated solely as a result of a period of transient occupancy.
As the issue of transient deregulation suggests, the rent registration system for SROs needs to be overhauled. Currently, SRO owners are required to file the same annual registration statements with DHCR as apartment owners. This makes little sense as SRO tenancies are different than apartment tenancies. The existing registration system allows SRO owners to use the dual, transient-permanent nature of SRO tenancies to deny SRO tenants their rights. Owners routinely register units as "temporarily exempt due to transient occupancy" even while they are occupied by permanent tenants. 146 Because DHCR checks the accuracy of registration statements, and because SRO tenants are poorly positioned to police owner conduct, there is relatively little risk to this scheme. 147 However, as discussed above, 148 the rewards are significant: a "temporarily exempt" registration can make it more difficult, or impossible, for a tenant to prove they are stabilized or are being overcharged. A simple change could help prevent this abuse. SRO owners should be required to register a regulated rent for each room, each year. In other words, each annual SRO registration should set forth the last rent paid by a permanent, rent regulated tenant for the room. This "room rent," rather than the accidental, and frequently false, regulatory status of a former occupant, would determine the outcome of any complaint. The legal regulated rent for a room would simply be the "room rent" plus applicable DHCR increases. To increase owners' incentives to comply with the rules, if a tenant successfully proved that a unit was improperly registered (or if an owner failed to file a registration), the rent for the unit should be set at the lowest legal rate in the building or $215, whichever is less, and treble damages applied for any overcharge. 
